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CRITICAL IDEALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL 




AbstrAct: This paper argues that the critical doctrine of the necessary unity of the thinking 
subject propounded in Kant’s Second Paralogism contains an idealist commitment to the 
metaphysically exceptional nature of the unifying activity of thought.   Rather than rejecting 
Kant’s transcendental framework as necessarily idealist and antagonistic to the current projects of 
speculative materialism, it is argued that transcendental philosophy should remain an important 
ingredient of any contemporary metaphysics. The implicit metaphysical idealism of Kantian 
critical idealism, it is claimed, in the end reveals speculative resources within the architecture 
of transcendental philosophy that can, if I am right, maintain the importance of the project 
of determining the epistemological legitimacy of metaphysical knowledge without reducing 
metaphysics to the subjective idealism of Kantian critical philosophy.
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‘Idealism is a kind of cancer in metaphysics which until now was 
deemed untreatable’.1
This paper begins from the commitment that the project of contemporary metaphys-
ics, which for good reason has recently rallied around the recuperation of philosophical 
speculation, should not abandon Kantian critical or epistemological concerns lest we 
restage the metaphysical battlefield properly maligned in the Preface to the first Critique 
as the source of the denigration of the queen of the sciences. The purpose of specula-
tive philosophy, as Hegel rightly saw, is not to overcome epistemological questions of the 
possibility of metaphysical knowledge, but to construct a metaphysical architecture that 
can account for the intelligibility of both objects and the philosophical comprehension 
     1. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon , trans. Karl Ameriks and 
Steve Naragon, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 382. 
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of those objects. Speculative philosophy, I claim, remains internally bound to transcen-
dental philosophy and opposed to philosophical dogmatism inasmuch as it requires a 
moment of metaphysical self-comprehension and epistemological self-validation. That 
is, in addition to grounding the intelligibility of objects it must also finally ground the 
intelligibility of its initial act of speculative construction and so show it to be more than 
capricious fantasy. What separates philosophical speculation from dogmatism, then, is 
this retroactive epistemological validation of its initially axiomatic assertion of the spec-
ulative identity of the subject and object. This essential connection between specula-
tive metaphysics and transcendental philosophy indicates the necessity of a continued 
engagement with Kantian critical philosophy even as we attempt to move beyond the 
correlationism he inaugurated. 
The way Kant developed his method of philosophical self-criticism, however, relies 
on a complex of loosely idealist metaphysical presuppositions, which are in principle 
incapable of internal justification, and so the Kantian articulation of transcendental 
philosophy must be altered if it is to be reconciled with contemporary materialist con-
victions and metaphysical aspirations. Specifically, Kant’s critical elimination of the pos-
sibility of knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and of things that transcend 
first-person experiential structures more generally, relies on the claim that the unity of 
the categories of substance, causality, etc. cannot be applied beyond the scope of expe-
rience because the unity of conceptual knowledge (which involves at least the unifica-
tion of the multiplicity of predicates contained in a concept) can only be provided by 
the foundational yet empty or merely logical unity of the spontaneous activity of human 
cognition. This empty, formal unity of cognition, which is different in kind to the ex-
ternal unity of composite material substances, requires that the manifold content of 
cognition be provided by sensibility (since the empty unity of apperception provides no 
content). The results of this analysis are two-fold: metaphysical research is limited to elu-
cidating the conditions of human experience while the humble sobriety of this limitation 
obscures the metaphysical idealism that lies at its base.  
If we accept the importance of Kant’s turn from dogmatic to transcendental phi-
losophy for maintaining the objective validity of metaphysics while at the same time 
rejecting rationalist means of securing this validity in a transhistoircal divine or human 
exceptionalism, the task of rethinking the nature of the thinking subject takes on a con-
siderable importance. We find just such an effort in the works of leading thinkers as-
sociated with the development of a transcendental materialism: Alain Badiou has long 
insisted that the cornerstone of his thought is a materialist theory of the subject2 and 
Adrian Johnston, often working through the work of Slavoj Žižek, has written extensive-
ly on the relation between subjectivity and transcendental materialism.3 When consid-
     2. See, for example, ‘A Materialist Reversal of Materialism’ in Theory of  the Subject, Alain Badiou, Theory of  
the Subject, trans. Bruno Bosteels, New York, Continuum, 2009, where we read: ‘We demand of materialism 
that it include what we need and which Marxism, even without knowing it, has always made into its guiding 
thread: a theory of the subject’ p. 182. For a more recent articulation of his materialist account of the subject 
see Alain Badiou, Logics of  Worlds (Being and Event, 2), trans. Alberto Toscano, New York, Continuum, 2009. 
     3. Johnston’s major treatment of these ideas is of course found in his Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental 
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ering the nature of the subject in transcendental philosophy, the natural starting point 
is the analysis of the limits of our knowledge of the thinking subject, or soul,4 found in 
the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Further, when the ideality or materiality of the soul is 
the specific object of concern, the Second Paralogism, which addresses the rational psy-
chologist’s claim that the soul is simple, so immaterial and incorruptible, will be the most 
suitable focal point of our speculative analysis of the Kantian project.
By mounting an explicitly speculative analysis of this Kantian text I will not reject 
the critical or epistemological character of transcendental philosophy, but will maintain 
it in a way that exceeds the subject-object dualism that organizes Kant’s own response 
to the question of the conditions of the intelligibility of the world. This transfigured tran-
scendental philosophy will, then, no longer afford a fatal primacy to the exceptional and 
uncognizable human ground of synthetic unity. My gamble is that the production of the 
internal unity of thought, once stripped of its subjective idealism, can be rendered con-
sistent with the real production of unity, and the subordination of metaphysical claims 
to the demands of epistemological validation can be maintained without lapsing into a 
kind of correlationism. 
Kant argues forcefully in the B Deduction that the highest condition of the intel-
ligibility of the world is the unity of conceptual representation. The minimal condition 
for such an intelligibility is the unification of a series of conceptual predicates with the 
appearance of the objects subsumed by that concept. ‘I am conscious to myself a priori’, 
Kant explains, ‘of a necessary synthesis of representations—to be entitled the original 
synthetic unity of apperception—under which all representations that are given to me 
must stand, but under which they have also to be brought by means of a synthesis’.5 After 
establishing the necessity of the synthetic production of such a unity, the natural ques-
tion is: how is this unity produced? or what produces this unity? The arguments of the 
Paralogisms are intended to undercut the necessarily subreptive nature of any non-crit-
ical response to such questions by preventing the objectification of subjective, transcen-
dental conditions of objective knowledge. An examination of the Second Paralogism 
reveals, however, that the apparently critical prohibition against positive claims identify-
ing the soul’s simplicity as the substantial ground for the unity of conceptual knowledge 
harbors an implicit idealism that must be rejected. 
The Second Paralogism, which is ‘no sophistical play’, Kant admits, ‘but an infer-
ence which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny’ (Kant, CPR, A351), asserts 
‘that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be 
Materialist Theory of  Subjectivity, Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 2008. Johnston’s continued engage-
ment with the topic is nicely represented in his somewhat more critical contribution to the ‘Real Objects 
or Material Subjects’ conference, to be published as ‘Naturalism or anti-naturalism? No, thanks—both are 
worse!: Science, Materialism, and Slavoj Žižek’, La Revue Internationale de Philosophie (forthcoming).
     4. Kant most often writes ‘soul’ rather than ‘thinking thing’, ‘transcendental subject’, etc. in the Second 
Paralogism, and so I will follow his language. It should be noted, however, that Kant does not afford the 
term ‘soul’ a meaning distinct from the more typical critical language of the subject. 
     5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Boston, Bedford/St. Martin’s 
Press, 1965, B135. All references to the first Critique will be cited in text as CPR followed by the traditional 
A and B pagination.  
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contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject’ (Kant, CPR, A352). Kant pres-
ents the inference supporting the rational psychological doctrine of the simplicity of the 
soul as follows:
That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several 
things acting, is simple. Now, the soul, of the thinking ‘I’, is such a being. Therefore, 
etc.(Kant, CPR, A351)
The major premise of the argument is simply a definition of simplicity, and so the real 
interest lies in the truth or falsity of the minor premise, which asserts that the soul satis-
fies the definition of simplicity. The rational psychologist’s argument for the truth of the 
minor premise attempts to extend the necessity that all thoughts can be accompanied 
by the ‘I think’ to a positive conclusion concerning the nature of the ‘I’ that thinks. That 
the unifying activity of the soul cannot be considered the coordinated activity of a mul-
tiplicity of (material) substances is supposedly shown by the internal or absolute unity 
characteristic of the transcendental unity of apperception. If the soul were composed of 
a multiplicity of substances, the argument goes, each of those substances would contain 
a portion of any thought that I have. ‘But this cannot be maintained’, Kant says on the 
rational psychologist’s behalf:
For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among 
different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore 
impossible that a thought should inhere is what is essentially composite. It is 
therefore possible only in a single substance, which, not being an aggregate of 
many, is absolutely simple.(Kant, CPR, A352)
The necessary unity of a thought, that is, requires that the thing in which that thought 
inheres, the soul, possess the same absolute unity of the thought itself. The unity of a 
thought cannot, in other words, be produced out of a multiplicity, and so there must be 
a simple ground which unifies the conceptual and phenomenal manifold. 
Kant begins his criticism of the Paralogism of simplicity by remarking that it is in 
fact the Achilles of rational psychology, which signals that he considers this argument to 
be the central and most powerful of this purported science of the soul. Despite his claims 
concerning the formal invalidity of the inference, Kant identifies the ‘nervus probandi’ of 
the Second Paralogism to be the truth of the minor premise: ‘if a multiplicity of repre-
sentations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the absolute 
unity of the thinking subject’ (Kant, CPR, A352). The question at hand is whether the 
soul is in fact the kind of thing identified in the major premise: a thing whose activity 
can never be regarded as the concurrence of the activity of several things. Kant’s analy-
sis of the Paralogism challenges the rational psychologist’s ability to prove the truth of 
this premise. The Paralogisms as a whole, accordingly, attempt to curb the dogmatic 
inclination to develop the transcendental necessity of apperception into a speculative 
metaphysics of the soul by insisting that there is no possible legitimate proof of the sub-
stantiality, simplicity, or personality of the soul.
The development of this negative or disciplinary function of the critical engage-
ment with rational psychology relies on a distinction that Kant introduces only after 
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addressing the four Paralogisms individually. Toward the end of the A Paralogisms he 
distinguishes between dogmatic, critical, and skeptical objections. Dogmatic and skep-
tical objections direct themselves toward the content of the proposition in question. A 
dogmatic objection ‘requires an insight into the nature of the object such that we can 
maintain the opposite of the what the proposition has alleged in regard to this object’ 
(Kant, CPR, A388). The materialist objection to the second Paralogism, for example, 
which rejects the impossibility of considering the activity of the soul as the concurrence 
of the activities of a multiplicity of substances, asserts a more accurate insight into the 
object itself (the soul), and on that basis, rejects the rational psychologist’s conclusion. A 
skeptical objection, relies on a similar dogmatic familiarity with the object, but argues in 
such a way that the assertion of the proposition and the counter-assertion of the dogmat-
ic objection have equal weight, which shows ‘that all judgment in regard to the object 
is completely null and void’ (Kant, CPR, A389). A critical objection, on the other hand, 
is not directed toward the content of the proposition, but toward its purported proof. 
Such an objection, Kant explains, ‘since it leaves the validity or invalidity of the propo-
sition unchallenged, and assails only the proof, does not presuppose fuller acquaintance 
with the object or oblige us to claim superior knowledge of its nature; it shows only that 
the assertion is unsupported, not that it is wrong’ (Kant, CPR, A388). Kant’s analysis of 
the Paralogisms restricts itself to such a critical operation. He accordingly criticizes a 
series of possible proofs that the soul is in fact the kind of thing whose activity cannot 
be considered to be the concurrence of the activity of a collection of discrete substances 
and exposes the weakness of these proofs in turn. The truth of the minor premise of the 
second Paralogism cannot, Kant argues, be proven through concepts alone (that is, ana-
lytically), through experience (that is, synthetically), or by inference from experience. 
An analytic proposition is, for Kant, characterized by the containment of the predi-
cate within the subject,6 and so the principle of all analytic propositions is the principle 
of contradiction.7 An analytic proof for the simplicity of the soul must, then, show that 
the concept of the unity of representation contains within itself the predicate of its simple 
ground.8 Such a proof is impossible, however, ‘For the unity of the thought, which con-
sists of many representations, is collective, and as far as mere concepts can show, may 
     6. See Kant, CPR, A6-7/B10: ‘Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is 
(covertly) contained in this concept A, or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in con-
nection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic. Analytic judgments 
(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection is thought through identity; those in which this 
connection is thought without identity should be entitled synthetic’. 
     7. See Kant, CPR, A150/B189-A150/B193. 
     8. This argument must be distinguished from the analytic necessity of the unity of the ‘I think’ articulated 
in the B Deduction. In §16 Kant writes, ‘This principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself, 
indeed, an identical, and therefore analytic, proposition’ (Kant, CPR, B135). The point in the Deduction 
is that I am only conscious of my representations insofar as the understanding has synthesized them in a 
single consciousness: ‘In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one 
consciousness, do I call them one and all mine’ (Kant, CPR, A134). The position defended in the Paralogism, 
which Kant argues cannot be proven analytically, is that we can argue from the necessary unity of apper-
ception to the necessary simplicity of the ground of apperception. 
COSMOS AND HISTORY54
relate just as well to the collective unity of different substances acting together (as the 
motion of a body is the composite motion of all its parts) as to the absolute unity of the 
subject’ (Kant, CPR, A353). The concept of the unity of a thought does not in itself con-
tain any reference to the simple or composite nature of the thing whose activity unifies 
the thought, and so the simplicity (or multiplicity) of the soul cannot be proven using 
concepts and the principle of contradiction alone. But neither can the proof of the prem-
ise be proven through experience. 
Kant’s objection to any proof of the simplicity of the soul through experience pro-
ceeds along two lines. First, he notes that the proper modality of judgments of experi-
ence is actuality, not necessity. Even if experience did furnish evidence of the simplicity 
of the soul, that would not establish the necessity of such simplicity.9 Second, and more 
interestingly, Kant argues that the unity of a thought can only be thought in the first 
person. I cannot, that is, think the unity of a thought that is not mine. He writes, ‘It is 
obvious that, if I wish to represent to myself a thinking being, I must put myself in his 
place, and thus substitute, as it were, my own subject for the object I am seeking to con-
sider (which does not occur in any other kind of investigation)’ (Kant, CPR, A353-354). 
A thinking being, unlike any other being, can only be considered from the perspective 
of that being. Why this is the case is not nearly as obvious as Kant asserts it is, how-
ever. Surely cognitive neuroscience is explicitly engaged in the investigation of thinking 
beings as objects; how, then, does Kant defend this position? 
In the introductory remarks to the Paralogisms he explains more generally that ‘It 
[‘I’] is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from 
them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve around in a per-
petual circle, since any judgment upon it has always already made use of its represen-
tation’ (Kant, CPR, A346/B404). When I think the necessary unity of representations 
in cognition in general, that is, when I attempt to take the ‘I think’ as the object of my 
thought, the unity of the object of that thought is conditioned by a more primary unity 
of the form of my own thought. Kant makes a similar point in the B Paralogisms, writ-
ing ‘The subject of the categories cannot acquire a concept of itself as an object of the 
categories. For in order to think them its pure self-consciousness, whish was to be ex-
plained, must itself be presupposed’ (Kant, CPR, B422). Insofar as I think the ‘I think’, 
another ‘I’, which is not the object of that thought, is necessarily at work. This elusive 
character of the ‘I’, its inability to be successfully objectified by thought, indicates, ac-
cording to Kant, that the necessary unity of the soul is an exclusively subjective condi-
tion of experience, which one cannot, in principle, render objective. The ‘I think’ ‘is not 
itself an experience, but the form of apperception which belongs to and precedes every 
experience’ (Kant, CPR, A354). Since the absolute unity of the ‘I’ is not itself an object of 
experience, but the condition of experience, there is no possible proof of the simplicity 
of the soul through experience. 
     9. He notes here that absolute unity is beyond the scope of possible experience without expanding on the 
point. This is presumably a reference to the resolution of Second Antinomy, where he argues that experi-
ence cannot provide us with simple, atomic constituents (see Kant, CPR, A523/B551-A527/B555). 
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Having eliminated proofs from both concepts and experience, Kant finally argues 
that one cannot prove the simplicity of the soul through inference. The simplicity of the 
soul as a real object is not the result of logical inference from the bare ‘I think’. Rather, 
Kant says, ‘The proposition, ‘I am simple’, must be regarded as an immediate expression 
of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is 
really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence immediately’ (Kant, 
CPR, A354-355).10 This marks a transition in Kant’s remarks on the Paralogism. Where-
as the previous two objections—to possible proofs through concepts and experience—
focused on the fruitlessness of speculation concerning the real simplicity of the soul, 
Kant now addresses the true meaning of the simplicity of the ‘I think’.11 The simplicity 
immediately contained in the necessarily subjective proposition ‘I think’ is not real or 
objective, but logical or transcendental. 
Having argued for the impossibility of proving the real simplicity of the soul either 
analytically through concepts or synthetically through experience, Kant concludes that 
the unity of the ‘I think’ has neither intelligible nor empirical validity, but is merely 
transcendentally legitimate. ‘This much, then, is certain’, Kant explains, ‘that through 
the “I”, I always entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject’ 
(Kant, CPR, A356). If the ‘I’ were not an absolute unity, it would be possible for me to 
have thoughts I would not know to be my thoughts. This, according to Kant, is absurd. 
‘It does not, however, follow’, Kant continues, ‘that I thereby know the actual simplicity 
of my subject’ (Kant, CPR, A356). As he argued concerning proofs from experience, the 
‘I’ can never be an object of experience, and so no objective judgments concerning its 
simplicity are possible. Summarizing the results of his reflection on the legitimate mean-
ing of the unity of apperception, Kant writes:
I may legitimately say: ‘I am a simple substance’, that is, a substance the 
representation of which never contains a synthesis of the manifold. But this 
concept, as also the proposition, tells us nothing whatsoever in regard to myself 
as an object of experience, since the concept of substance is itself used only as a 
function of synthesis, without any underlying intuition, and therefore without an 
     10. Kant is apparently thinking of the passage in Part I, Section VII of the Principles of  Philosophy: ‘Accord-
ingly, this piece of knowledge—I am thinking, therefore I exist— is the first and most certain of all to occur to 
anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way’ (René Descartes, Principles of  Philosophy, in John Cottingham 
et al. (eds.), Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. John Cottingham, et al., New York, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998, p.162). Kant seems not to have heeded Descartes’ insistence in his reply to the second 
objections that the existence of the self as a thinking being is not known through syllogistic inference, but 
through immediate intuition (René Descartes, ‘Objections and Replies’, in John Cottingham et al. (eds.), 
The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, trans. John Cottingham et al., vol. 2, 2 vols., New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984, p. 100.). (Kant’s library included copies of the Principles (Amsterdam: 1650), the third 
edition of the Meditations (Amsterdam: 1650), and the Geometry (Leiden: 1649), but not the Discourse on Method 
[see Arthur Warda, Immanuel Kants Bücher, Berlin, Martin Breslauer, 1922]. Despite not owning a copy of 
the Discourse, Kant does refer to that text in his metaphysics lectures in the winter semester of 1972-1793 [see 
Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, 382]). 
     11. Much of this discussion of the legitimate meaning of the subjectively necessary unity of apperception is 
left out of the B Paralogisms as it is addressed at greater length in the B Deduction (especially §16), in which 
the ‘I think’ figures considerably more prominently than in the A Edition. 
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object. It concerns only the condition of our knowledge; it does not apply to any 
assignable object’.(Kant, CPR, A356)
Taken transcendentally, that is as the condition of cognition, the soul can only be re-
garded as a simple unity; taken as an object of philosophical or theological speculation, 
however, there are no grounds for positively establishing either the simplicity or mul-
tiplicity of the soul. This result of Kant’s criticism of the Paralogism, importantly, does 
not establish the falsity of the rational psychologist’s claim. Such a falsification would be 
dogmatic. Instead it indicates the lack of support for that position. The absence of theo-
retical support for a position does not, however, indicate its absurdity, and there might 
in fact be good practical reasons for maintaining an unprovable theoretical position. 
Accordingly, Kant concludes his remarks on the second Paralogism by considering the 
possible pragmatic value of assuming the objective simplicity of the soul. 
The prima facie virtue of the doctrine of the real simplicity of the soul is the soul’s 
substantial difference from matter and consequent incorruptibility. If the simplicity of 
the soul can be neither proved nor disproved theoretically, there might, then, be prac-
tical reasons for maintaining its objective validity.12 The spatiality of matter guarantees 
that it can be divided, and so any particular material body is subject to the possibility of 
material corruption and dissolution. If the soul is not distinct from matter, then, its im-
mortality cannot be proven. Kant argues, however, that even if we assume the real sim-
plicity of the soul, ‘we still cannot make the least use of this proposition in regard to the 
question of its dissimilarity from or relation to matter’ (Kant, CPR, A357). Referring to 
the result of the Aesthetic Kant remarks that bodies or matter are objects of outer sense 
and not things in themselves; the soul, on the other hand, is an object of inner sense, and 
so cannot be material. ‘This is equivalent to saying’, he explains, ‘that thinking beings, as 
such, can never be found by us among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, con-
sciousness, desires, etc., cannot be outwardly intuited. All these belong to inner sense’ 
(Kant, CPR, A357). The soul can be distinguished from empirical matter as an object of 
outer sense, then, without appeal to the assumption of the simplicity of the soul. 
Further, it is possible that the transcendental substrate of empirical matter is identi-
cal with the soul. Despite the phenomenal difference between objects of inner and outer 
sense, it remains possible that their noumenal grounds might nonetheless be identical. 
The assumption of the simplicity of the soul is insufficient to distinguish it from matter 
considered as a transcendental object, and so cannot prove the soul’s immortality. Kant 
writes:
I can therefore very well admit the possibility that it is in itself simple, although 
owning to the manner in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition 
     12. This argument, that the immortality of the soul is a consequence of the assumption of the real simplic-
ity of the soul must be distinguished from the practical necessity of postulating the soul’s immortality. The 
practical postulate of the immortality of the soul is built upon the necessity of rendering the practical pos-
sibility of the highest good coherent and not upon the assumption of some unproven theoretical proposition. 
For Kant’s discussion of the postulate of the immortality of the soul see Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Practical 
Reason, in Mary J. Gregor (ed.), Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, pp.238-239. 
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of the extended and so of the composite. I may further assume that the substance 
which in relation to our outer sense possesses extension is in itself the possessor 
of thoughts and that these thoughts can by means of its own inner sense be 
consciously represented.13(Kant, CPR, A359)
Any potential moral or pragmatic benefits we thought might issue from assuming the 
simplicity of the soul absent of any positive proof, then, are only illusory. Even if the soul 
were objectively and not only logically simple, it could still be basically similar to matter, 
and so subject to corruption and dissolution.14 
Kant refutes both idealist and materialist accounts of the real constitution of the 
thinking subject in the Second Paralogism, as we have seen, by arguing for the impos-
sibility of proving either the simplicity of multiplicity of the soul. The minor premise of 
the Paralogism, that is, cannot be proven true by any argumentative strategy Kant can 
identify. The critical idealist position requires that the highest condition of the intelli-
gibility of the world, the unity of apperception, can only be thought as a condition of 
thought and cannot itself be a legitimate object of knowledge. Although we know that 
all thought must be brought under the absolute unity of the thinking self, we cannot 
determine what the nature of the real ground of that unity is. The consequences of this 
necessary agnosticism concerning the real substrate of thought for the possibility of a 
materialist articulation of transcendental philosophy have not, however, been univer-
sally recognized. There are scholars who argue in a functionalist vein that knowledge of 
the necessary activity of the soul does not provide knowledge of the ultimate subject of 
that activity, and that this separation, which is at the heart of the Paralogisms, does not 
challenge but in fact supports a reconciliation of Kant’s critical idealism with the mate-
rialism of much contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience.15 I main-
tain, however, that, although accepting the argument of the Second Paralogism secures 
us against the idealist thesis of the simplicity and immateriality of the soul, Kant’s solu-
tion remains tacitly idealist. This idealism is manifested in two interrelated hallmarks of 
anti-materialist thought, which I will only briefly mention. First, the argument analyzed 
above concerning the impossibility of taking the thinking self as an object of knowledge 
     13. Although presented here as something of a speculative fabulation, this is quite close to the position 
Kant had presented in the ‘Physical Monadology’ as a resolution of the conflicts between Leibniz’s mon-
adological metaphysics and the infinite spatial divisibility of Newtonian natural science. See in particular 
Immanuel Kant, ‘Physical Monadology’ in David Walford (ed.), Theoretical Writings: 1755-1770, trans. David 
Walford, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 53-58. It should be noted that even in his pas-
sage, as elsewhere, Kant does not entertain the possibility that the soul is in itself composite.
     14. In the B Edition Kant bolsters this result with a criticism of Mendelssohn’s proof of the incorruptibility 
of the soul from the Phaedo. Kant’s criticism of Mendelssohn, the full argumentation of which far outstrips 
the scope of this paper, amounts to a recapitulation of the difference, developed at some length in the 
Principles of Pure Understanding, of the difference between intensive and extensive magnitudes. See Kant, 
CPR, B413ff. 
     15. See, for example, Andrew Brook, Kant and the Mind, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995 and 
Patricia Kitcher, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. For opposing 
positions, both with regard to the compatibility of critical idealism and materialist philosophy of mind and 
to the truth of such an approach to the philosophy of mind, see Henry Allison, ‘Kant’s Refutation of Mate-
rialism’, The Monist, vol. 72, no. 2, 1989, pp. 190-208. 
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without simultaneously displacing it as the subject of that same knowledge effectively re-
inscribes the Platonic and Cartesian dualism of thought and matter within the transcen-
dental architecture. The translation of this dualism into Kant’s transcendental position 
results in the conclusion that the highest condition of the intelligibility of the world is in 
fact different in kind than the world whose intelligibility it renders possible. No materi-
alism can accept such a position. If transcendental philosophy is capable of supporting a 
genuine materialism, then, this conclusion must be circumvented. A transcendental ma-
terialism must conclude that the conditions of the intelligibility of the world do not tran-
scend that world but are ultimately rooted in it. The second hallmark of idealism implic-
it with the critical dissolution of the Paralogism hinges on the distinction between our 
consciousness of the necessary unifying activity of the self in the absence of any possibil-
ity of genuinely cognizing that self, on the one hand, and the cognizability of the natural 
world. We find this same structure, in which we are consciously familiar with the ground 
of the possibility of cognition despite our inability to cognize it, in Berkeley distinction 
between spirits and ideas.16 We certainly cannot saddle critical idealism with the weight 
of Berkeley’s metaphysical idealism on the basis of this structural similarity alone. The 
primary effect of this distinction within the transcendental idealist framework, however, 
is that there is an insuperable rift between the transcendental subject of knowledge and 
the material world as objects of possible knowledge. It is in principle impossible, within 
the confines of critical idealism, to understand the process of the natural emergence or 
development of our faculties of cognition. The conditions of the possibility of knowledge 
cannot be thought within the categories of history. If transcendental philosophy is to 
become materialist, then, it must be shorn of its implicit subject-object dualism, and ac-
companying human exceptionalism, and its purported immunity to historical analysis.  
In order to excise the implicit metaphysical idealism within the Second Paralogism and 
to advance the cause of a transcendental materialism, then, I will now outline the devel-
opment of a speculative potential contained within the Paralogism. Much work remains 
to be done on this front, and rendering transcendental philosophy fully materialist re-
quires attention to elements of the Critique of  Pure Reason not addressed at all here,17 so 
these remarks should be recognized as the mere outline of a much larger research pro-
gram. My speculative response has the perhaps peculiar character of accepting Kant’s 
arguments against both idealist and materialist attempts to determine the real substrate 
of thought. Rather than rejecting his arguments against the materialists, I will suggest 
a speculative method of establishing the multiplicity, and so materiality, of the ground 
of the unity of thought. To this end I will attempt to indicate how the system of criti-
cal idealism is altered when, rather than accepting the impossibility of determining the 
truth or falsity of the minor premise of the Second Paralogism, we affirm its falsity. I will 
     16. See George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of  Human Knowledge, Kenneth Winkler (ed.), 
Indianapolis, Hackett, 1982, pp. 80-81.
     17. Perhaps the most important issue to be investigated is Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of space and time. 
This position is without a doubt at the heart of the key transcendental distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves, and whether a philosophical position can remain transcendental while denying the 
ideality of space and time is not at all clear.
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speculatively assert, for the time being, that the unifying activity of the soul can in fact 
be considered to be the result of the coordinated activity of a multiplicity of substances. 
Then, following the speculative logic mentioned above, I will explain how this specula-
tive assertion might come to retrospectively validate the truth of what is initially only 
an assertion. 
If it is shown to be possible for a composite to produce the internal unity that char-
acterizes conceptual knowledge, then we have, at the very least, undermined a cen-
tral pillar of Kant’s subjective idealism. The highest condition of the intelligibility of 
the world, the synthetic unity of conceptual and intuitive representation together with 
the structurally guaranteed non-corporeality of the source of that unity necessitates the 
idealism of Kantian transcendental philosophy. Absent any real or material ground for 
the internal unity of thought, the condition not only of knowledge but of the possibility 
of knowledge, which is to say of the intelligibility of the world itself, must lie within the 
transcendentally ideal structures of thought. This is of course Kant’s deep idealism: the 
intelligibility or lawful regularity of the world itself is conditioned by the synthetic ac-
tivity of the thinking subject. If the synthetic activity of transcendental subjectivity is a 
special case of the emergence of absolute, logical unity from material multiplicity, how-
ever, a transcendental subordination of metaphysics to the conditions of the possibility 
of knowledge need not amount to asserting the dependence of the real intelligibility of 
the world on human thought. The transcendental unity of apperception, in other words, 
need not, in this case, be the seat of transcendental philosophy’s human exceptionalism; 
it may instead be one of many instances of a more general production of ideal unity on 
the basis of real multiplicity. 
Given the possibility of the transcendental identity of the activities of thought and 
matter, and the impossibility of non-dogmatically determining the reality of the mate-
rial ground of thought, we would do well to move beyond the opposition between dog-
matism and criticism. If we simply assert the capacity of material substance to generate 
logical unity we will not have advanced beyond the Kantian problem, we would have 
merely ignored the critical injunction against dogmatic assertions. There is another 
option available, however: we can assert the possibility of the material constitution of 
the unity of the ‘I think’, and so clear the way for the conclusion that the activities of 
thought and matter are actually and not merely possibly predicates of the same tran-
scendental subject, and then, drawing out the consequences of this speculative decision 
within the larger critical architecture, retrospectively justify our initially dogmatic as-
sertion. The critical rejection of a materialist theory of the subject might be effectively 
excised, that is, through speculation. This amounts to offering a method of proof not 
considered by Kant in his criticism of the Paralogism. We recall that Kant shows the im-
possibility of proving the simplicity of the soul through concepts alone, through experi-
ence, and through inference. The speculative advance, which I am only sketching here, 
does not directly prove the composite nature of the soul and then proceed to deduce the 
metaphysical identity of the substrate of thought and matter. Rather, it assumes that, 
under certain conditions, material composites can produce the logical unity characteris-
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tic of apperception, and, on the basis of this assumption, develops an alternative deduc-
tion of the objectively valid deployment of the categories of knowledge that can retro-
spectively provide an epistemological validation of the original speculative assumption. 
Kant may be correct that a direct proof of the simplicity or composite nature of the soul 
is impossible, but his critical rejection of any positive doctrine of the nature of the think-
ing subject might nonetheless be overcome by such an indirect method of argumenta-
tion. I will now conclude by very briefly sketching how this speculative recuperation of 
the epistemological justification of the otherwise dogmatic assertion that multiplicities 
can produce the logical unity characteristic of apperception might work.
The limitation of knowledge claims to those possible on the basis of first-person ex-
perience and the concomitant elevation of human thought to the highest condition of 
the intelligibility of the world rest, as I have argued, on the inability to know whether 
composites can produce the internal unity of representations. The limitation of concep-
tual intelligibility to the field of sensible intuitions, which is the ultimate critical justifi-
cation for the impossibility of knowing the real identity of thought and world, relies on 
the conclusion that knowledge is a certain combination of multiplicity and unity, the 
multiplicity of the sensible manifold and the unity of its conceptual intelligibility. The 
transcendental unity of the synthetic activity of thought, precisely because it is not a 
multiplicity18 cannot provide the manifold it unifies, and so the intelligible structures of 
the categories can only be applied legitimately to the sensible manifold provided by in-
tuition.19 Knowledge is limited to possible objects of sensible experience, then, because 
the source of the formal unity of knowledge cannot itself provide the manifold content 
it unifies. The formal unity of the self, precisely because of its logical simplicity, cannot, 
on Kant’s account, provide the content of its cognitions, and so must receive it through 
perception. If the ground of the unity of representations is itself multiple, however, there 
is an internal connection between the formal unity and sensible manifold of conceptual 
knowledge in this material composite itself. Categorial knowledge need not, then, be 
limited to the realm of sensible experience because the manifold content of knowledge 
(as well as its formal unity) both stem from the material condition of the intelligibility of 
the world. All knowledge need not, then, be knowledge of objects of sensible experience, 
and the limits of transcendentally authorized metaphysics can be considerably redrawn. 
Specifically, once first-person sensible experience is compromised as a necessary 
condition of knowledge, it is no longer in principle impossible to prove the identity of 
the subjects of intellectual and corporeal activity. By initially assuming that the activity 
of composite substances can produce the internal unity necessary for knowledge, then, 
we can alter the metaphysical prohibitions of the critical edifice such that this dogmatic 
assumption, which still acts as a condition for the possibility of knowledge, can itself 
become an object of possible knowledge. This dogmatic gamble, then, is—or at least 
might be; the details of an alternate Deduction remain to be worked out—retroactively 
legitimated by the epistemological structures that it authorizes. The implicit metaphysi-
     18. Which is not to say that it is in itself simple. 
     19. See §§20-23 in Kant, CPR B143-149. 
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cal idealism of Kantian critical idealism, I claim, in the end reveals speculative resources 
within the architecture of transcendental philosophy that can, if I am right, maintain the 
importance of the project of determining the epistemological legitimacy of metaphysical 
knowledge without reducing metaphysics to the subjective idealism of Kantian critical 
philosophy. 
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